

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Administrative Staff, ORE.

DATE: 20 May 1948

FROM : Chief, Presentation Division, Administrative Staff, ORE.

SUBJECT: Appraisal of the Presentation Division.

1. Presented herewith is an appraisal of the Presentation Division after six (6) months operation under its present Chief. This study in no way supercedes the study with proposed Table of Organization which was submitted by this division in November, 1947.

2. Whereas the November appraisal concerned itself primarily with a discussion of personnel needs in the light of the mission and functions of the Presentation Division, this study is more concerned with an appraisal of the mission of the unit within CIA and a discussion of its functions.

3. Assuming that the basic mission of the Division remains the same, i.e. to provide oral, visual and graphic intelligence aids for the entire CIA organization, the following problems present themselves for discussion:

a. The overall problem which faces this Division is a question of responsibility. In view of the nature of its function (which is to present intelligence by means of illustration, graphic analysis, stenographic reporting, cartographic displays and oral interrogation of Government officials) the problem of apportioning the workload with respect to priorities becomes of major importance. Although verbal directions have been received from the former Deputy Assistant Director, ORE, that the Office of Reports and Estimates would, at all times, receive top priority there has never been a written directive to this effect. As a result, a certain amount of confusion has been experienced in an effort to service all of CIA.

b. This problem of responsibility and priority extends to another service of the Presentation Division in a slightly different manner. The responsibility of making available to CIA the various government officials who have recently returned from abroad rests with this Division. In order to accomplish this function it becomes necessary to utilize the transportation afforded ORE. The question of priority of transportation requests within ORE then presents itself. Granted that the Assistant Director and his Deputy are given first priority in all cases, the question then devolves to the status of the Presentation Division in relation to the rest of ORE. When dealing with these government officials, who are brought to ORE at the request of specific branches, it must be borne in mind that they are extremely busy officials and often operating on "tight" schedules during the limited time they are in Washington. Delays in picking them up not only causes the conference time to be cut short, but also wastes the time of eight, ten or a dozen interrogators. Delays in returning these officials to their offices is embarrassing to the Presentation Division and often causes

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the individual to leave CIA in a disgruntled mood, thereby undoing the good will ORE may have established.

c. Based on the above-mentioned problems and ensuing discussion, the following recommendations are submitted:

✓ 1. A directive be issued by CIA outlining the services available to the organization by the Presentation Division (including the existence of the Situation Room) and incorporating a statement that although these services are primarily for the use of ORE, every effort will be made to service the other Offices as time permits.

2. A memorandum be issued within ORE outlining the priorities of transportation with respect to all concerned below the Assistant Director's level.

4. The foregoing paragraphs have dealt with problems regarding the mission of the Presentation Division. Within the scope of that mission certain problems have arisen relating to the accomplishment of the functions established by this mission of service. The primary problem among the functions is that related to the Situation Room and its operation.

a. The Situation Room was established by CIA to offer to CIA and the IAC agencies the salient features of the world intelligence situation as it relates to the security of the United States. It was visualized, upon its inception, that when completed such a room would be the focal point within CIA where, at any time, authorized personnel of the IAC agencies could receive a professional briefing on all matters of current and basic intelligence throughout the world. With the physical separation of ORE, the greatest user of such a service, this idea appears to have been laid aside by the management of CIA as well as by the branches of ORE. This is evident by the fact that the Situation Room is so understaffed (one competent individual) that during the past six (6) months it has barely managed to keep alive. This gives rise to the following question.

b. Does CIA, and specifically ORE, want a Situation Room? In answer to this, the writer finds it inconceivable that the top intelligence organization in the Government should be without such a room and yet, such a view has been expressed on at least one occasion. The argument given at that time was that the Director of CIA can get any specific world picture desired, on a moments notice, by direct contact with ORE or the appropriate IAC agency. With world conditions as they are, it is not inconceivable that two or more situations might "break" simultaneously, and it takes no stretch of the imagination to visualize the resulting confusion in an effort to collect and coordinate the desired information. While the above argument has been advanced by the management of CIA, it appears that ORE does not share this view as there are

indications in at least four instances that the branches of ORE are leaning towards independent situation rooms within their own units. If such a condition persists, then thought must be given to the physical security factor within ORE's present location. In furtherance of the argument for the maintenance of the Situation Room, the desire has been expressed by at least one IAC agency member (Navy) that such a centralized room would be of immense value in carrying out CIA's primary mission of coordination among the IAC agencies.

c. If it may be assumed, then, that both ORE and CIA desire a Situation Room then the problem becomes one of location and personnel for maintenance. In respect to the location, it is fully realized that the split location between ORE and the Situation Room becomes the prime deterrent of its use by branches of ORE. The following two methods are designed to overcome this difficulty until the entire ORE organization may be placed under one physically-secure roof:

1. Until sufficient, competent personnel can be allocated to the Situation Room, the Presentation Division will provide to the branches of ORE, large (6 x 8 feet) portable map and chart studies of any area or topic desired. These studies will contain any desired information based on facts and figures provided to the Situation Room by the branches. Accompanying charts, graphs or other visual aids will be provided upon request. Due to the size of these portables and the classified data contained thereon, it will be necessary to remove them daily from ORE's present location for safekeeping in the Situation Room.

2. With an allocation of sufficient, competent personnel to the Situation Room, the ultimate goal under present circumstances will be achieved. To digress for a moment, the use of the expression "competent personnel" should be clarified. It appears to be a mistaken idea in the minds of those recruiting personnel for the Presentation Division, that in order to maintain a Situation Room it is necessary to employ artists, illustrators and draftsmen. This, it is believed, stems from a lack of knowledge of what is accomplished in a Situation Room. The personnel required for such operations must be (1) well informed in the field of current intelligence, (2) experienced in the fields of cartography and geography, and, (3) well-able to think and speak on their feet in relation to the foregoing prerequisites in order to "brief" anyone desiring the current intelligence picture. (It should be noted here that the Department of the Army and Navy have no less than three(3) persons doing this same work and carrying grades of Lt. Col., Lt. Comdr., P-3, CPO and SP-6). From this comparison it is readily noted

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that a knowledge of illustration, graphics and art is only a part of the requirements of such personnel.

In order to achieve the maximum use and efficiency from the Situation Room, the Presentation Division will present and maintain the entire world-wide intelligence situation within the room on a current basis. This will be displayed cartographically, statistically, graphically, orally and augmented by many audio-visual devices. From this picture within the room, small studies (16" x 24") of any desired area will be produced on short notice. (These are devised with special acetate overlays permitting frequent changes with ordinary crayons and office pencils and where possible, utilize existing map and graph bases already printed by CIA and IAC agencies in order to save time and expense.) These maps will be forwarded to any requesting branch of ORE and may be used by them, not only to depict a particular situation, but as "work maps" from day to day. They have the added advantage of being sectional and easily folded for deposit in safes at night. Therefore, any branch of ORE may retain a stock of these map studies to work from and, at periodic intervals, the Presentation Division will remove them to the Situation Room, bring that room's situation up-to-date from the material provided by the branch and return the "lap" maps with the current situation posted thereon in a professional manner.

d. Thus it follows that if the Situation Room is to be continued there must be an increase in competent personnel. Failing this, it can only be hoped that the Situation Room can service ORE and CIA by means of portable maps which, at best, will give a limited picture of a situation and limit the scope of this picture in relation to the world. This latter condition will be better than no Situation Room at all, but it must always be borne in mind that in event of a general break in critical world conditions, a Situation Room will be the focal point in CIA -- and a Situation Room cannot be thrown together overnight. Thus, the following recommendations are submitted:

1. To continue the Situation Room as originally intended.
2. Increase the personnel by at least one (1) competent visual information clerk and, if possible, one (1) cartographic engineer or presentation specialist.
3. Upon acquisition of needed personnel, institute the "lap map" system of keeping ORE supplied with graphic intelligence and the Situation Room current until all of ORE is under one roof.
4. Discourage, by directive, the establishment of branch situation rooms within ORE.

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5. The final problem presented stems from those incurred in the definition of responsibilities and the proper exercise of functions which have been discussed above. The personnel problem is integrated with the above two problems in that the decisions relating to those problems directly affect the decision regarding personnel. It is regrettable to state, but the morale of personnel in the Presentation Division is dangerously low. This is due to the following reasons:

Specified
a. Lack of definite knowledge for whom they are working, which has resulted in an overburdening amount of high priority work causing physical strain as well as long hours of overtime.

b. Insufficient personnel which causes specialized personnel to become jack-of-all-trades instead of professionals in the work for which they were hired.

c. The knowledge that the T/O of the Presentation Division appears set at the present grades and all personnel feel they have reached a "dead end" within CIA regarding their specialized abilities.

Since these reasons appear valid at the present time, it is quite understandable why morale is low. If the recommendations that have been suggested in the foregoing pages can be implemented, it is felt that morale will improve considerably although the increase in grades of personnel within the Division will remain an outstanding problem. Failing the accomplishment of these recommendations it is feared that the Division will suffer a loss of personnel who desire advancement in their professions.

[Redacted Signature Box]

Chief,
Presentation Division

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SUMMARY

Briefly it is suggested that:

A. A written directive be issued which establishes the priorities of service to be performed by the Presentation Division.

B. A written directive be issued to establish the Presentation Division's priority for transportation in relation to the needs of the ORE branches.

C. Continuation of the Situation Room as originally intended with an increase in personnel of at least one (1) visual-information clerk and, if possible, one (1) cartographic engineer or presentation specialist.

D. Implementation of a graphic intelligence posting service for ORE upon acquisition of above personnel in the Situation Room.

E. A written directive be issued to discourage the establishment of individual situation rooms within ORE.

F. Consideration be given to the increase in grades of the personnel within the Presentation Division.

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